The objectives of the Soviet military in relation to the Slovak National Uprising have since been hotly debated. Slovak Democratic leader Jozef Lettrich later claimed that the Soviets hoped the freedom fighters would bleed themselves to death, and thus pave the way for a communist takeover. Accusations directed against the Soviets for military responsibility in the Slovak tragedy resemble similar criticism of Soviet actions during the Warsaw uprising of 1944. There, too, the Soviets were accused of holding back aid to an anti-Nazi uprising. Soviet historiography must be permitted to respond. Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Mateyevitch Shtemenko, writing his memoirs in the 1970s, claimed that the Red Army was overextended after its summer drive through Byelorussia. Moreover, since the Polish Home Army was--by its own admission--anti-Soviet, the insurgents launched their action without informing the Soviet military, thus leading to the destruction of key bridges spanning the Vistula River. Shtemenko angrily added that the Western Allies would likewise not have been pleased if resistance elements had launched a revolt ahead of their lines without even informing them.

Here Shtemenko raises a legitimate argument. But, like many retired Soviet military officers writing their memoirs during the Brezhnev era, he was not completely candid. When he wrote of a Polish army being organized in the U.S.S.R. after the Nazi invasion of June 1941, he stated that its members had come to the Soviet Union as refugees or "in some other way." Even a full generation after the death of Stalin, there were Soviet veterans such as Shtemenko who were unwilling to acknowledge that several million Poles had been deported to the Soviet Union as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939.

Shtemenko addressed himself to allegations concerning the Soviet role in Slovakia. He claimed that the Soviets informed the Czechs of the obstacles lying ahead of a Red Army penetration. The Germans enjoyed military command of the northeastern Carpathian rim, particularly along the Arpad Line guarding the approaches to Hungary. Shtemenko stated that the Soviets had the capacity to send no more than 170 transport planes across the Carpathians, each of which could only carry 20 troops apiece and their equipment. Moreover, each plane would have to make five to six trips to put two rifle divisions into Slovakia. Nevertheless, although the Soviets had entertained no notions of entering Slovakia, they were now prepared to do so to support their treaty obligations. Shtemenko noted in his memoirs that Czech president Edvard Benes was unwilling to distribute arms for a popular insurrection, and claimed the latter feared he would lose control had he done so.

Coinciding with the time that Benes concluded the renewed treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union and the underground Slovak National Council was formed, a number of Slovak officers and soldiers serving in the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps under Soviet command sent an appeal across the Carpathians to their opposite numbers still serving on the German side. They had actually composed this manifesto for the 25th anniversary of the previous Slovak National Council's declaration of intent to unite with the Czechs, promulgated on October 30, 1918. The current appeal was strongly Pan-Slav in content. It denounced the Nazi war against Soviet Russia, and stated that this conflict had potentially catastrophic consequences for the Slovak people. It denounced the leadership of the Slovak State for supporting this conflict. The manifesto lamented the "degradation" of Slovak troops dispatched to the Eastern Front, and declared that the strategic aim of both Nazi Germany and Horthy's Hungary was to divide the Slovaks from their brother Slavs--specifically, the Russians and Czechs. It called upon Slovak soldiers to support whatever partisan activity already existed in Slovakia. (The Janosik Brigade was specifically mentioned.) It called upon them to concern themselves with the future of their children. While avoiding all the sticky issues of the interwar period, the manifesto declared the Czecho-Slovak merger of 1918 to be a positive step forward. Confident that they would advance across the mountains to their homeland, the Slovaks of the 1st Army Corps called on their opposites to support them. They praised Marshal Stalin as leading the struggle against "German barbarism," and advocated a "new democratic Czechoslovakia."

Slovakia was considered to be in the Soviet sphere of military operations. The Soviets were tacitly expected by the Western Allies to provide the bulk of support to the uprising. Since the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to obtain in postwar Czechoslovakia, they agreed. Although the Soviets did not wish to admit it, they were really not in a position to give the uprising the needed measure of support. At the time of the planning of the uprising, the front was 200-250 kilometers away from insurgent territory. Ahead of the Soviets were the Carpathians. Autumns here were characterized by heavy rains and fog--conditions which made the landing of aircraft a perilous undertaking. The Soviets nonetheless assigned the 4th Guard of the Gomel'sk Air Squadron and the 5th Guard of Orel Squadron to form an "air bridge" between Soviet-held territory in Poland and Slovakia. A key feature in strengthing the uprising would be the Soviets transporting the 2nd Czechoslovak Paratrooper Brigade to insurgent territory.

The 2nd Czechoslovak Paratroopers, meanwhile, were active in combat in southern Poland. They aided the 1st Ukrainian Front 38th army in transferring the main attack from the center to the left wing opposite enemy forces concentrated at Dukla Pass. After hard fighting in the Carpathian foothills, the brigade was grouped in Kroscienko until September 22, 1944. The Soviets had planned to move the brigade by air across the mountains on September 18-21. Since the brigade only finished fighting on the 19th, commander General Vladimir Prikryl asked for three days' time for rest and regroupment before resuming operations. Owing to inclement weather on the other side of the mountains, the delay was further extended. The first of the brigade was launched seven days later than originally planned. The weather was not conducive to the operation at this time either, but the Czechoslovak paratroopers were chafing for action and Prikryl could countenance delay no longer. The transport was flown by Soviet Captain N. S. Larianov. It was unable to land at Tri Duby, and after a thir try Larianov brought the plane down on the uneven airstrip of Rohazne. Credit must be given to Slovak Lieutenants T. Zachar and J. Bystricy, who lit flares at the last possible moment, enabling the transport to land without catastrophe.

Marshal Ivan Koniev was ordered by the Soviet High Command to launch a breakthrough to insurgent territory. Dukla Pass was the designated route: it afforded access to partisans in the Presov Region, and the opportunity to descend to the plains of Hungary. It was also hoped that the movement would cut off the 1st Panzer Army from Army Group North Ukraine. The task of assaulting the mountain pass was given to General Kiril Moskalenko's 38th Army and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. The 1st Guard Cavalry Corps, 25th Tank Corps, and secondary units would then effect a deeper penetration to insurgent territory.

General Ludvik Svoboda, commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, was optimistic of an early breakthrough at Dukla Pass. The battlefield which lay ahead of the Soviet and Czechoslovak forces was, however, an extremely formidable one. Dukla Pass is 15 to 20 kilometers wide and 15 to 20 kilometers long. In addition to heavily defending it with armor, infantry and artillery, the Germans had planted thousands of land mines. The initial engagement was extremely bloody. Later, Svoboda would admit that faulty reconnaissance played a role in the high casualties.

At dawn on September 8, a two-hour artillery barrage preluded the advance of Moskalenko's 38th Army towards Dukla Pass. The movement was initially successful, although Czechoslovak troops, slogging along waterlogged roads, were not able to come up from the rear in time. By nightfall German resistance began to stiffen. After two days of fighting, Soviet riflemen penetrated Krosno and the second line of German defenses. But Dukla had yet to be cracked. Koniev selected a gap of less than 2,000 yards on Moskalenko's flank east of Dukla, and dispatched the 1st Guard Cavalry to make a breakthrough to the German rear. The 1st Guards launched their attack on the night of September 12, but were quickly closed off by German troops in their rear. Again, the Red Army was in no position to reach insurgent territory. Two Czechoslovak brigades--the 1st and the 3rd--suffered losses of up to sixty percent. Theoretically, Presov could be reached in six days; in fact, it remained beyond the Czechoslovaks' grasp for four months.

The role of artillery in the Carpatho-Dukla operation should not be underestimated. As Soviet commander Moskalenko noted in his memoirs, 82.2% of the artillery available to him was concentrated on the line of the main attack. The attack was preluded by 1,517 artillery pieces and 1,724 mortars. On the average, there were 140 artillery tubes per one kilometer of front. They were backed by air support. Just before the appointed hour of attack, the artillery was set up at one piece every hundred meters to the depth of 1.5 kilometers. The initial barrage fell upon the hapless Lemko village of Mszana. The fate of this village, located directly in the middle of the Soviet line of advance, serves as representative of other Lemko villages just to the north of Dukla Pass.

The initial Soviet line of battle led through the village of Iwla to Tylawa. The 101st Infantry Corps was entrusted with the attack. The plan was to reach Tylawa by the second day, and on the third day to reach Svidnik in Slovakia. When the main artillery barrage hit Mszana, the terrified villagers fled into the surrounding woods. And the drama did not end there. The plan of crushing German resistance in a few days could not be accomplished. The town of Dukla was taken on September 20, and on the 24th the 14th Tank Brigade under Colonel A. E. Skidanov entered Mszana. The battle for the neighboring village of Smerczne began. Here steel reinforced bunkers protected the German position. On September 26, the decision was reached on the Soviet side to break through the Arpad Line. In Mszana and neighboring villages, three infantry divisions were concentrated, backed by three tank corps of the 38th Army. There were 900 artillery tubes concentrated at 160 per kilometer, backed by air support. This concentration attracted a counterbarrage by German artillery on Mszana. When the campaign ended with the Soviets and their Czechoslovak allies forcing their way through Dukla Pass, the villagers returning to Mszana could not recognize anything. All was gone. The same applied to the villages of Hyrowa, Tylawa, Olchowiec, Ropianka, Wilsznia and Smerczne. All these villages had simply ceased to exist.

A definite sense of solidarity developed between Soviet and Czechoslovak troops during the Carpatho-Dukla operation. This fact was confirmed by Ivan Yakolevitch Kurbatov, a Russian artilleryman who wrote about his own experience well after the war ended, and, indeed, after popular sentiment turned against the Russians following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Kurbatov served as part of the 4th Katyusha Battalion, which employed the multiple rocket launchers that were the curse of German armor on the Eastern Front. The 4th Katyusha Battalion, commanded by Guards Major V. M. Kislov, was attached to the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. It arrived on the third day of the offensive, and was ordered to act together with the 1st Brigade under General Jaroslav Vedral-Sazavsky. The arrival came at a point when the offensive had slowed considerably. Near Dukla Pass individual engagements became sharper and more sustained. The Nazis tried by all means to prevent Czechoslovak and Soviet troops from breaking through the pass and linking up with the Slovak partisans.

Particularly critical were the battles for Height 534 and Mount Hyrowa/Girova. These mountains were of higher range than others. The Germans occupied a commanding view, and their artillery afforded the offensive side no rest. The 4th Battalion's radio unit was destroyed by German artillery, and the battalion was isolated. Fortunately for its members, Svoboda had a thorough knowledge of the geography of the Carpathians, and dispatched the necessary forces to rescue them. Height 534 changed hands several times. Mount Hyrowa proved equally formidable, with an isolated German unit pouring fire on the Czechoslovaks advancing to rescue the Katyusha battalion. The Katyushas consequently directed their own fire power against this position. Kurbatov later noted that every fire point of the Germans "needed to be smoked out."

In spite of such examples of wartime camaraderie, there were instances of friction owing to the presence of zamopolits at the front. Major Adam Novak, a London Czech temporarily assigned to the 1st Army Corps, found himself charged with insubordination. After the initial setback, Novak requested a meeting with Marshal Koniev to ask for a postponement of a second attack. A criminal complaint was lodged against him by the NKVD liaison officer. It was supported by Major Jaroslav Prochaza, the principal zamopolit assigned to the 1st Army Corps and a fanatical Communist. Prochaza had made himself something of a "grand inquisitor" among the corps in the past two years. Fortunately, the charge against Novak was dismissed, and he returned to England.

Svoboda did not intervene in the Novak affair one way or another. Later, he was inclined to view the matter as an unfortunate but unavoidable administrative misanthropy which occurs during wartime. As far as his personal courage was concerned, his Soviet superiors found no fault with him. If anything, they considered him too zealous. Marshal Koniev considered himself obligated to admonish Svoboda for advancing to the front line to observe the enemy positions and to inspire his troops in their advance. Army corps commanders, according to Koniev, were not supposed to do such things.

At the end of the month, through fog and heavy rain, the Soviet and Czechoslovak troops resumed their advance. The 1st Brigade was now headquartered in a church in Zyndranowa, directly above the Polish-Slovak border. It is worth noting that its commander, General Vedral-Sazavsky, had been posted to the 1st Army Corps by the London government. Svoboda's generally contemptuous attitude towards the "Londoners" bypassed Vedral, as he ordered the latter to further the advance. At the same time, Svoboda credited the better mobility of the Soviet T-34 tanks as the decisive factor in gaining the edge over their Mark IV German opposites. On the night of October 5, Svoboda's command center was informed that the enemy had given up ground and fallen back. A reconnaissance patrol led by Sergeant Nebiljak probed ahead. At 6 a.m. of the following morning it reached a frontier post. It thus crossed the border into Slovakia. The bulk of the 1st Brigade now likewise moved forward. Vedral-Sazavsky, like Douglas MacArthur and Rudolf Viest, had vowed to return. Now he did so. Yet, one kilometer beyond the border, he stepped from his jeep directly onto a land mine. He was killed instantly.

The entrance into Slovakia had come at a staggering cost. An estimated 6,500 men of the 1st Army Corps had been killed, almost half of its original strength. Overall, the Soviets and Czechoslovaks sustained an approximate 80,000 casualties, with almost 20,000 killed in action. German casualties are estimated roughly at 20,000. One noteworthy casualty was Jozef Krisko. He was born on November 22, 1909, in the village of Vysny Komarnik. Vysny Komarnik is the farthest village north of Svidnik on the Slovak-Polish border, at the southern end of Dukla Pass. In autumn 1939, like many Rusyns further east, Krisko decided to walk northward to view the "workers'paradise" which the Soviets were organizing in East Galicia. Like these Rusyns also, he was arrested by the NKVD for illegal border crossing and sent to the Gulag. Fortunately, like other former Czechoslovak citizens interned in the Soviet Union, he was released in 1942 and permitted to join Svoboda's 1st Army Corps. In this capacity he was wounded in the battle for Kiev in November 1943. Krisko's status in the Soviet Union dramatically improved. He was awarded the Czechoslovak War Cross for valor, and sent to a hospital in the Caucasus for convalescence. He returned to the front with the rank of major, commanding a machine-gun detachment. He received honorable mention for his participation in the struggle for Height 534. On October 6, 1944, Jozef Krisko was among the Czechoslovak soldiers who stormed through the pass. Since his home village was the first one across the border, the reader might well imagine the exhilaration Krisko felt. Yet here he was struck by a bullet and thus wounded a second time.

Looking ahead of the story, it should be noted that Jozef Krisko continued to experience tribulation followed by resurrection in the postwar era. Although he emerged from the war as a decorated hero, Krisko became caught up in the purge of the Czechoslovak military which took place at the end of the decade. Falsely accused of treasonous activity, Krisko served three years in Pankrac Prison in Prague. Afterwards he was drafted again into the army, this time without rank. He spent most of the remainder of his working life as a truck driver. His major source of solace was his wife, Lizaveta Ladikova, a woman of Uzhorod, who stood by her man through several decades of tribulation. After the collapse of Communism, Czechoslovak officialdom became more charitable to Jozef Krisko. Under Vaclav Havel regime, the Ministry of Defense declared Krisko fully exhonorated and bestowed upon him the rank of colonel of the reserves. He was buried with full military honors in Prague on October 16, 1993.

The Carpatho-Dukla operation did not end simply with the storming of the pass. Instead, the combat zone shifted to Eastern Slovakia. South of the pass and directly west of the village of Dobraslava lies an area which has come to be known as the "Valley of Death." Here Soviet and German armor clashed in a miniature reenactment of the great tank battle of Kursk. Once again, the Soviet T-34 tanks outnumbered and outgunned their German opposites.

The Germans began giving ground in Eastern Slovakia. Svidnik was heavily damaged in the fighting, and the Germans torched much of the area as they withdrew. Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a liberator when he entered the town on October 28, and was declared an honorary citizen of Svidnik.

After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allied side went over to the defensive. In the hill country between Svidnik and Presov, partisans waged a determined struggle in the German rear. This aspect of the struggle for the Carpathians merits further attention, resulting in a massacre near the hapless village of Tokajik. The author's next essay shall address itself to this key particular.

R.VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN