August 29 marks the 60th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenske narodne povstanie--SNP). This event was both a landmark in the history of the Slovak people and a chapter of World War II history featuring a determined struggle against Nazi tyranny. At a time when German armies were being pushed back on the Eastern Front, their nominal Slovak allies turned their guns on the Third Reich and carried on resistance for two months.

A number of Slovaks--particularly among those who emigrated to Western countries after the war--have maintained that the Slovak National Uprising was not a popular struggle. According to them, those elements who launched the uprising were not representative of the Slovak people. They rose against their own state, contributed to its destruction, and paved the way for Slovakia again becoming part of Czechoslovakia, albeit on less than equitable terms.

To what extent does this hold true?

It is true that the Slovak Republic which existed between 1939 and 1945 was nominally independent, having its own flag, postage stamps and diplomatic representation in other countries. It is also true that, for the average citizen, the standard of living was fairly high, and food prices remained low for much of the war. The government of the Slovak State, headed by the priest Jozef Tiso, enjoyed enough leeway to resist pressure from more pro-Nazi elements. The Slovak Republic cannot be labelled a fullfledged fascist state.

But these advantages carried with them a certain price tag. Slovakia was bound in military alliance to Nazi Germany after Czecho-Slovakia disintegrated in March 1939. As the war progressed, so did German interference in the Slovak economy. While Tiso's government resisted German intervention in most domestic affairs, it went along with a Nazi plan to "resettle" Slovak Jews. It was thus compromised for all posterity. In fairness, it must be noted that Tiso's government halted the deportation of the Jews once their real fate became known.

As the war progressed, an opposition developed to the Tiso regime. This opposition came from basically two quarters. One of them consisted of Slovaks who did not favor severing all links with the Czechs. Another was the Communists, who did not plan on resurrecting Czechoslovakia, but favored a Slovakia either allied with or part of the Soviet Union. Political leaders of the two factions joined together in December 1943, when Edvard Benes, president of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London, renewed a treaty of alliance with Soviet leader Stalin. They formed an underground Slovak National Council, which pledged to stage an uprising against the regime and seize power when circumstances warranted such a move. Out of deference to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia would indeed be restored. It was envisioned, however, that the Slovaks would play a larger and more autonomous role.

A number of Slovak Army officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Golian, made contact with the exile government in London. They planned to take over the Slovak State at a time when Soviet armies reached Krakow, in southern Poland. The mountain passes (particularly Dukla Pass) would then be opened to afford the Soviet military easy access to the plains of Hungary.

By now yet another resistance element was emerging. Already political dissidents, Jews fearing deportation, and escaped French, Soviet and Yugoslav prisoners of war had formed partisan units in the mountains. In summer 1944 their numbers were subsequently increased by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathians into Slovakia. These Soviet partisans were hardened veterans of guerrila warfare on the Eastern Front. They took their orders from Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev, and payed little heed to the injunctions of either the Slovak National Council or the Military Center which Golian had established in Banska Bystrica, central Slovakia. Both the Slovak National Council and the Military Center feared the partisans would cause the Germans to intervene militarily before the uprising could be launched according to timetable. Indeed, the partisans caused considerable apprehension on the part of the Reich by blowing up tunnels and bridges, as well as by terrorizing and massacring ethnic Germans of Slovak citizenship.

The partisan murder of members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia on the night of August 25-26 brought matters to a head. Berlin resolved to militarily occupy the country and disarm the Slovak Army, which it considered unreliable. A number of Slovak officers who had been initiated into the conspiracy lost their nerve and became indecisive at this critical moment. Such was not the case of Lieutenant Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica, who, on the morning of August 29, issued the coded order to commence hostilities.

One of the officers who lost his nerve was General August Malar, commander of the East Slovak Army. His group was entrusted with the task of opening Dukla Pass to the advancing Soviets. His indecision resulted in German troops advancing southward through Dukla Pass, disarming his soldiers and sending them to prisoner of war camps. Malar was himself executed by a German firing squad. Consequently, Soviet troops advancing on Dukla Pass would not be met by friendly Slovak units, as originally planned.

Elsewhere in Slovakia, the fortunes of war fluctuated. Resistance in the northwest was particularly successful, owing in large part to former French p.o.w.s serving as partisans under Lieutenant Georges Balazar de Lannurien. In the southwest, an ominous new front was opened by the action of SS Regiment Schill. Its bloodless takeover of the Nitra garrison, containing some 2,000 men, was a major blow to the insurgent cause. The garrison commander, Major Smigovsky, remained loyal to the Tiso regime. Although a number of his officers favored the uprising, the majority of his troops followed him. Ultimately, they followed SS Regiment Schill in its march on the rebel center of Banska Bystrica.

The Allied powers dispatched military missions to rebel headquarters during the uprising. The Soviet mission was the first to arrive on September 5. Golian wanted a stronger Western presence at headquarters, and an American and British mission arrived soon afterwards. A significant number of American, British and Australian airmen had been shot down over Slovakia in dogfights, and had become prisoners of war. Once the uprising was proclaimed, they joined readily. The Anglo-American military missions were sent to evacuate them, but also brought needed weapons, medical supplies and advisors to the insurgents. Their members served in the struggle until the bitter end.

On September 10, Golian was promoted to general by order of the London government. It did not make him a happier man. Golian's expertise lay in organization, without which the uprising could not have been initiated. He was, however, inexperienced as a field commander. He was moreover beset by opposition at headquarters, particularly emanating from the Communists. A War Council was established to coordinate operations between the regular military and the partisans, but it became meaningless when partisan commanders either acted on their own or on orders from Kiev. After the fall of Turciansky Svaty Martin on September 20, most active cooperation between the army and the partisans ceased. The accompanying crisis in morale at headquarters cannot be blamed solely on the Communists. Pro-Czech commanders such as Golian were unashamed to announce that they wanted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as it existed before the war. It never occured to them that many Slovaks were fighting for something different, not the least of which was recognition of their own distinct identity. The Communists had taken this difference into account.

What was clearly needed was a commander who could somehow keep the peace between the two factions. The choice fell upon Rudolf Viest, the only Slovak holding general's rank in the army of the First Czechoslovak Republic. In summer 1939 Viest escaped from Slovakia and became deputy minister of defense in the exile government. During the middle of the war he was dispatched as part of a Czechoslovak military mission to Moscow. On October 7, Viest was flown to Slovakia to supercede Golian. He landed at the rebel-held airstrip of Tri Duby, 12 kilometers south of Banska Bystrica. Viest's first order was to recapture the village of Jalna.

Jalna, small as it was, had a certain strategic importance. It was situated in the Hron River valley, above the point where the highlands gave way to the lowlands. Elsewhere in Slovakia, where the insurgents had to give up ground, there were still mountain ranges to fall back upon which protected the rebel center core. In the south, however, the fertile lowlands served as a soft underbelly for the German advance. In the area of Jalna, there was a kind of "bottleneck"--a narrow pass behind which Banska Bystrica lay. Its capture was imperative. The task was given to the newly arrived 2nd Czechoslovak Paratroopers. On October 10, they attacked along a line from Trnava Hora to Jalna, supported by partisans attacking to prevent German units in Ziar nad Hronom from helping the defenders. If only for once, there was full coordination between the partisans and the regular Slovak military. In this manner Jalna was recaptured on October 12. It was the last of few victories won by the Slovak insurgents.

Meanwhile, a particularly ominous situation was developing in the south. In spite of strained relations between Slovakia and Hungary, the latter country had opted not to intervene against the uprising. But efforts by Hungary to pull out of Hitler's war resulted in a Nazi-engineered coup in Budapest which installed a fullfledged fascist government in power. This relieved numerous German troops in Hungary from garrison duty, thus enabling them to participate in the onslaught underway further north. Among the most noted units was the Horst Wessel Division, composed entirely of ethnic Germans from the Banat region of Hungary. The Horst Wessel Division was already well seasoned in antipartisan operations in the Balkans. Now, it flanked SS Regiment Schill in a northward drive.

As German forces approached Banska Bystrica from the south, the leadership of the Military Center evacuated from the city and retreated to the Low Tatras to the north. Members of the Slovak National Council were flown off to sanctuary behind Soviet lines just before German tanks reached the airfield at Tri Duby. At that point an escape route was closed to other participants, including members of the American and British military missions. On the morning of October 27, SS Regiment Schill entered Banska Bystrica without firing a shot.

German reprisals followed. On November 4 both Viest and Golian were captured. They were dispatched to Berlin and there executed. Members of the American and British military missions who were captured were dispatched to the concentration camp of Mauthausen, in Austria. Notwithstanding the fact that they had been captured in uniform, they were tortured for what information could be gained and likewise executed. Groups of Slovak soldiers, fighting in partisan style, continued resisting in the mountains through the bitter winter that followed. They could not light a fire at their campsites, so as to expose their positions to German troops patrolling the valleys. Consequently, more died of hypothermia than those who were killed by enemy bullets.

Ultimately, the success of the Slovak uprising hinged on a Soviet breakthrough at Dukla Pass. Indeed, on October 6, the 38th Soviet Army of General Moskalenko and the 1st Czechoslovak Army corps forced the pass and arrived on Slovak soil. But these troops were not able to reach insurgent territory in the central highlands in time to save the uprising. Since that time, the question has been raised as to whether the Soviets could have done more. That issue of controversy is addressed in the author's next essay.

R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN